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REPORT ON THE CAUSES OF, AND CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING, 
THE EXPLOSION WHJCH OCCURRED AT SIX BELLS COLLIERY, 
MONMOUTHSHlRE, ON 28TH JUNE, 1960 
15,h December, 1960. 
The Right Honourable Richard Wood, M.P., 
Minister oJ Power. 
Sir. 
1. In accordance with your direction under Section 122 of the Mines 
and Quarries Act, 1954, 1 held a public inquiry with respect to the accident 
which occurred at Six Bells Colliery in the County of Monmouth on 
28th June, 1960. 
2. 1 find that :in ignitIOn of firedamp occurred at about 10.45 a.m. 
near the face of the intake airway and loading gate of the 0.10 conveyor 
face in W District of the Old Coal Seam, that coal dust was raised and 
ignited and that the explosion spread practically throughout the district. 
Forty-dive of the forty-eight men there at the time were killed; theiT 
names are given in Appendix I. The evidence in general. and in particular 
the known presence of letha'l concentrations of carbon monoxide. suggests 
that the victims lost consciousness rapidly and that death occurred within 
a few minutes. The three survivors were on the fringe of the explosion 
area and escaped with only minor injuries. There was no satisfying 
evidence of the initial igniting cause but, on rbalance, I consider it probable 
that the firedamp was ignited by an incendive spark caused by the impact 
of a quartzitic stone falling from the roadway roof near the face ripping 
lips onto a steel canopy provided to shelter the roadway conveyor during 
blasting operations. 
3 .  I opened the ;nquiry in No. 2 COUrt of the Civic Centre. Newport, on 
19th September, 1960, and sat on eight days until 28th September. 'J1he 
following parties were represented;-
The Minister of Power. by Mr. C. Leigh. M.1.'Min.E., H�M. Divisional 
Inspector of iMines and Quarr.ies. South Western Division. with 
Dr. E. M. Guenault. Deputy Director of the Safety in Mines 
Research Esta1blishment. 
The National Coal Board, by Mr. G. G. Baker, Q.c., with Mr. A. G. 
Davies. Barrister-at-Law. 
The National Union of Mineworkers. The South Wales Area. by Mr. E. 
Ryder Richardson, Q,C., with Mr. I. B. Fife, Barrister-at-Law: the 
National Executive Committee. by Mr. W. Whitehead, President 
of the South IWales Area. 
The National Association 0/ Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Slwtfirers. 
by Mr . P. Wien. Barrisler-at-Law. 
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The National AssociaJion of Colliery Managers and the British Associa­
tion of Colliery Mallagemem, by Sir Andrew Bryan. D.Sc., LL.D., 
F.R.S.E., M.I.Min.E. 




5. Six BeUs Colliery, formerly known as Arrael Griffin Nos. 4 and 5, 
is in the No. 6 Area of the National Coal Board's South Western Division 
and is situated at Six Bells. some twelve miles north of Newport in tbe 
Western Valley of Monmouthshire. 
6. There are three shafts. One of these, a downcast and man-riding 
shaft known as Vivian Pit and situated nearly half a mile north. was 
formerly part of another mine and jts existence is not material to the 
circumstances of this accident. The other two are at Six Bells and arc both 
used for winding men, coal and materials. No. 4. the upcast. is equipped 
with an eiectricalJy driven exhausting fan with a capacity of 280,000 cubic 
feet per minute at 4'6 inches water gauge: No. 5 is the downcast. 
7. There were] ,213 men employed below ground and 239 on the surface. 
The output was about 1,800 tons of saleable coal per day. about 830 tons 
coming from the Old Coal Seam. 
8. The colliery has always been a safety lamp mine. There were 1.450 
electric cap lamps, 85 flame lamps for use by workmen as firedamp detectors 
and 79 internal relighler type flame lamps for use by officials. 
9. The Under-manager of No. 5 Pit. wh.kh included W District, was 
F. White, who was killed in the explosion: the Colliery Manager was 
V. Luther: the Group Manager, R. Williams; the Area Production 
Manager. A. E. Hiscox; and the Area General Manager, L. Walker. 
The Old Coal Seam 
10. The Old Coal Seam, the lowest worked, was 352 yards deep at 
the Six Bells shafts but the average depth of W District was 550 yards. the 
increase being due in part to seam dip but mainly to surface rise. The 
seam thickness averaged four feet nine inches with a middle din band 
a few inches thick. The Meadow Vein coal, some 22 yards above, had 
not been worked in this area. The strata between these seams were mainly 
strong ' clirt' or shale, but included two features which call for special 
mention. Some five feel above the Old Coal Seam there orten occurred a 
bed 'Of quartzitic sands:none about one foot three inches llhick. This was 
found in the shaft sinkings and observed in parts of the district after the 
explosion. There was also a . rider' coal, some one fOOl six inches thick, 




1 1. Plan No. I shows the W District in relation to active and disused 
workings from Nos. 4 and 5 Shafts of Six Bells Colliery and also to disused 
workings in the Old Coal Seam from Marine Colliery. where a disastrous 
explosion occurred in tbe Black Vein in 1927. 
12. The working [aces in the W Distrkt were identified by a number 
prefixed by the letter' 0 '. There were three single-unit longwall con­
veyor faces situated between one mile and one mile and a quarter from 
the shafts: all three were advJncing northwards towards the disused 
workings of Marine Colliery The 0.10 unit had on its right sjde the gob 
of a series of previously worked faces; 0.12 unit was beginning to skirt 
the left side of 0. 10 unit; 0.18 unit had solid coal on both sides. The 
gradients of the intakes and faces are shown on Plan No. 1 : road ways rose 
slightly towards the faces which. in turn. rose slightly from west to east. 
0.10 and 0.18 were normal production units and 0.12 a standby face; coal 
was filled for two weeks out of three on lhe morning shift and in the third 
week on the afternoon shift. 
Methods of working coal 
\3. The 0.10 face IVas 103 yards long and had been advanced at the 
rate of about 12 yards a month to within Jbout 55 yards of the Marine 
Colliery olJ workings. The coal was cut near the Hoor to a depth of 
three and a quarter feet by a machine mounted on an armoured conveyor: 
both machines were compressed air dnven. Hydraulic props and linked 
bars a metre long were used in a • prop-free front' system of support. 
The roadside packs were eight yards wide and the waste between was 
completely caved. The intake loading gate was supported by steel arches 
backed with wood lagging. the necessary height being obtained by a roof 
ripping six feet thick. The arches, l"\\eive feet wide and ten feet high. 
were commonly known as twelve feel arches. The road that had formerly 
been the intake for 0.9 face had become the supply road for 0.10 and 
was being reoonditioned as the face advanced. Shots were fired !in coaJ 
and in the stone of the intake face ripping. 
14. The 0.18 face was 96 yards long a'nd had been advanced at 1he 
rate of  about 27 yards -a monLh. The coal was cut nea.r the Hoor to a 
depth of four feet six inches and filled by hand onto a belt conveyor. both 
machines being d riven by corn pressed air. The roof was su pported by 
adjustable friotion-type props and linked ba.rs four feet six inohes long. 
The waste had been oompletely caved until djfficult roof conditions prompted 
a change in May, 1960, to strip packing; the packs were four yards wide 
and the wastes nine yards. The intake rood was supported with l!\velve 
feet arches for the first 200 yards of its length and with eight feet arches. 
eight feet wide and seven feet high. for the last 40 yards. The return 
was supported with tcn feet arches. The necessary height was made by 
ripping majnly in the roof. Shots were fired in coal and. except in the intake. 
in stone. 
15. The 0.12 slruldby face was 1 18 yards long. The coal was worked 
and filled by hand onto an electrically driven scraper chain oonveyor. The 
face had been advanced a total distance of 20 yards, and only ten yards 
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in the six months before the explosion; it was last worked for one shift 
on &1lh June. 1960. 
Transport of coal and supplies 
16. Coal from the face conveyors was transpoPled by way of slag e 
loadors a nd semi-t�oughed belt gate oonveyo rs ·to two 30-inch belt trunk 
conveyors in tandem on the main intake; all were electrically driven. The 
tram -loa ding p oint was on the do uble part ing near old 0.1 intake. 
17. Suppli"" for 0.18 unit were dist.ributed in trams by a S)"tem of 
compressed air driven haulages from the double parting through 0.7 Cross­
cut It<> Ilhe main retum and thence to .the face of the supply gale. Those 
,for 0.10 rand 0.12 un_its were taken in tram s through 0.7 Crosscut to the 
main return. then back through 0.2 Cross cut to the main intake and there 
off-loaded and ma.llIhandled; they were drawn up 0.10 supply gate on a 
single tram hauled by a compressed air driven engine situated near the face. 
Ventilation 
18. The directions of the main ventilating cunren1S are shown by 
coloured arrows on Plan No. 2. A little more than 5,<X>O cubic foot of 
air per min ute entered 0.10 face from ots loading gate and about another 
1.500 cubic feet per minute of oon1'folled leakage air passed a long the 
supply gate. The firedamp content at the statutory observing point, 30 feet 
on tlte return si de of the iace. averaged about 0'25 per cent. About 9.500 
cubic (eet of aiI per minute reach 0.18 face and the percentage of fire damp 
30 feet from the face averaged 0·8. There was no express provision made 
to deflect air onto 0.12 face, but some----,measured after the explosion to be 
3.300 cubic feet per minute a1 the lower end of .the f ace-naturally took 
rt.bis COUf5e and. to this exte.nt. ftihe ventilation of 0.18 face was in series 
with that of 0.12. 
General experience 
19. T'he 'Only major d iffi,oulty encountered in the 'Wo'rkring of 0.10 unit 
arose from a large roof cavity which developed in the intake neaT two 
parallel fnults some 170 yards from the main in take. The eavity apparootly 
began aI\. the roadhea.d and extended as the face advanced until it was 
at lcast 30 feet long and some 20 to 30 feet high from the roof of the 
seam. and certainl y as high as the' rider' coal. The arches set beneath 
the cav.ity were originaJJy covered with timber and some debris. 
'I1Iris oondition migll1 have been alt ered by repair w ork. but 
it seems mOTe than pr obable mat by the tinle th.e exp losion occurred there 
was a c onsiderable tlhickness of fuJJen stone above 'lhe lagging. Firedamp 
appareDltly accumuJated above tJhe debris and was sometimes ,found at the 
face rip })ing until. but not after. 9th May. 1960; at the llime of the 
explosion it was not considered necessary to maintain a mttice sheet at 
the <ace ripp ing. Small quantiti"" of firedamp continued to be found quite 
frequen'ly elsewhere in the wllt. 
20. Firedamp in small quantity was found occasionally at the 0.12 loader 
gate fnoe ripping. 
21. The most serious tt'oubJe from the ventilation point of view was 
enoountered in 0.18 unit. F.iredamp was frequently ·found at ·the intake 
roadhead face r.ipping and from time to time shots could not be fired mere. 
4 
The area ventilation engineer. R. W. Simpson, investigated the problem 
in DecernOOr. 1959. and on Ihis recommendation a .• Venturi " type air blower 
was installed at the ripping. This did not, however. altogether overcome 
the difficulty and in May. 1960. "he thickness of the roof ripping was 
reduced from about six feet to three feet by taking up ""me of the floor 
and reducing the size of the road\\ay by using eight feet arches. The 
manager prohibited shotfiring at Ithe ripping and arranged for methanometer 
surveys of tlhe unit with daily trepo.rts Qf ,the results. Another " Venturi " 
was installed in the face ripping of the reLmn roadhead. 
THE SHlFl'S lMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE EXPLOSION 
The Afternoon Shirt on 27th June 
22. Coal filling proceeded nomlMly throughout nhe aJitemoon shifot of 
27th June on 0.10 unit under the supervision 'Of W. Doel. an ovomna'n. 
and 1. D. MeDonald. a deputy. R. Hall. a deputy aoting as a shOOirer. 
assisted by K. Baker. a collier. ·fired some 30 shots in the coal; neither 
Hall nor the overman, who had tested the waste at the return end of the face 
before any shots were fired. found any indication of firedamp. McDonald. 
on his mid-shift inspection, found small feeders of firedamp in 0.10 and 0.9 
returns and in 0.12 loader gate. During his pre-night shirt inspection. he 
found the same small issues. 
23. T. G. Morgan, the overman in charge of 0.18 said that. because 
of trouble with the conveyors, coal filling started late in the Shift and the 
. cut' was not cleared. The deputy for 0.18 unit. D. E. Price. during 
both his mid-shift and his pre-night Shift inspections. found firedamp at 
[he face 'Tipping �n the return, at the face ripping '0'( the intake, and at 
two places on the face. Lt was reported to /tim late in the shift tha t a 
coupling on the face conveyor motor had been sparking, but when he 
reached the place this had been attended to by a filter and Price was 
satisfied �hat �he trouble 'had been rectified. 
Tbe Nigbt Sb.ift on 27th-28th June 
24. Only ripping and repair work was being done on the night sbift of 
27th-28th June in 0.10 unit. where deputy R. H. Law was in charge. In his 
mid·shift inspection, he found SIDa'll quantit'ies of firedamp in the returns 
of 0.9 and 0.10. During iris pre·day shift inspection. he found sligbt 
indications of firedlmp in the return end of lhe waste and in the return 
of 0.10 unit, in 0.9 return rippings and in a cavity farther ou�bye. He clid 
not find any 11redamp in 0.10 intake rippings during either of his inspections. 
25. At about 3.00 a.m .. E. Boots. a shotfirer. assisted by 1. H. Ev.ns. 
fired a ['ound of four shots witlh 13 six-shlOt ex.ploder in 0.10 tintake 
face rippings. Boots said that be tested for firedamp; he examined the holes 
with a break detector and charged each of them with two four-ounce 
cartridges of Unigex explosive. Evans fiUed sufficient stemming bags with 
stone dust. Boots did not put a filled bag at the back of any hole before 
cbarging. He fired the round. examined the rippings for firedamp and 
pulled down some loose stone. Law was not present during the shotfiring 
but in his inspection later he noticed some bed separation at the face of the 
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ripping. The fore·poling supports had nOt been advanced, but he con· 
side red (ha( (his could safely be left (or (he day shilt as nothing was likel) 
(0 fall. 
�6. In 0. 1 8  unit deputy W. C. Nash. during his pre-day �hift inspection. 
detected some firedamp in the in.take ripping and there replaced a brattice 
sheet. There was no shotfiring in this unit during the night. 
27. W. V. Jenkins Jnd A. Mathews, underground fitters. were puning 
a two-inch compressed air supply pipe through an existing hole in the brick­
work of 0.9 Undercasl. They noticed that an a_roh girder on the face side 
of the undercast had shifted slightly and that a small quantity of debris had 
fallen, but they apparently considered that there was no immediate danger 
of further falls. The compressed air was twice cut off from the whole 
district as Jenkins also repaired a tapping gland on an eight inch corn· 
pressed air supply pipe. The first period was from about 1 1 .30 p.m. to 
12 . 15  a.m. and the second from about 5.30 am, to 6,15 -a.m. During 
these periods the" Venturi ,. appliances in 0,18 un.it could not function. 
The Day Shift 00 28th Juoe 
28, The day shift descended as usual between 6.00 a.m. and 6.30 a.m. on 
28th June, Nobody can say what work the men were doing on that shift, 
bUl the manager said he would have expected the following distribution 
five men, includjng the deputy, on 0. 1 0  face; three or four men on the 
face rippings of 0.1 8  intake; two men working the cool cutting machine 
at the return end of 0,18 face; l maximum of six supply men in 0_18 
return; JnJ a borer and his assistant in the return just oUlbye of the 
crosscut near 0.18 unit. The rest of the men, who normally would have 
been advancing packs, withdrawing supports and advancing the face 
conveyor. should on this shift have been along the main loada belts because 
the manager, having received a report that the conveyors were getting 
inlo a dirty state. had arranged that they should th! thoroughly cleaned. 
THE EXPLOSION AND RECOVERY 
The Explosion 
29. At about 1 0.45 a.m. on Monday, 28(h June, M. Purnell, a linesman. 
was working with D. Lane putting up a signal line near the electric haulage 
engine some 25 yards inbye of the entrance of the old T intake. Lane was 
some ten yards inbye of Purnell \\hen there was a noise and a lot of dust. 
Purnoil fell on the engine and Lane was blown past him. Purnell had 
no idea what had happened but when he picked h.imself up he found Lane 
apparently dead. He lbegan to make his way to the pit bottom, feeling 
along pipe ranges because the air was thick with dust. 
30. Two finers, H. 1. Legge and C. J. Lewis, were eating food by (he 
transformers in the mouth of the old T intake when they heard a sound 
like a compressed air pipe bursting. There was a greal deal of dust in 
the air and they lost contact with each other but each made for the pit 
bottom 'as best he could. Legge thought that a transformer had blown up 
and on his way outbye he telephoned to the pit bottom. Shortly afterwards 
he met S. Holland, a deputy, and \V. Coleman. an underground en!ine.er. 
who were coming in to investigate, and told them of his experience. 
6 
Rescue and Recovery 
31. S. Holland was the deputy responsible for the inspection of airways 
and thus had a good knowledge of the pit; he and Coleman had been 
coming outbye from an old district when they met a cloud of dust. They 
thought that a compressed air supply pipe had broken and they hurried to 
{he downcast pit bottom. The dust cloud had also been seen alt both 
shafts and someone had telephoned the surface. Holland received from the 
manager at the surface a telephoned instruction to investigate, and he 
and Coleman went inbye along the main intake towards W District. They 
met a number of men going about their normal work and were told that 
a man nearby was feeling ill; Holland gave instructions for him to be 
taken out of the pit. He did not speak to the man who, as he realised 
later, must have been Lewis. 
32. Holland and Coleman later met Legge who told them of his 
experience at old T transformers. They went to these transformers but, 
finding them apparently undamaged, returned to the main intake and 
continued inbye. A few yards past the junction with old T intake tbey 
saw a body which must have been lhat of Lane. At the double parting 
they found the air so thick with dust that they concluded an explosion 
must have occurred. They were unable 10 make contact with the pit 
bottom by telephone so Holland sent Colernan out to report to the manager 
and went on alone. Just inbye of the airbridge at 0.7 he found a fall of 
ground almost blocking the main intake and decided la retreat. On the 
way outbye he noticed that one of two separation doors in the mouth of 
old T return was damaged. The other was open; be closed it and observed 
then a considerable increase in the quantity of air passing down the main 
intake. 
33. Holland continued outbye and met the manager and the -area general 
manager. who happened to be making a visit to Ihe colliery; he reported 
his findings to them and the manager issued instructions that all men were 
to be withdrawn from the pit and the emergency procedure put into operation. 
All three hastened to the surface to study the plans of the mine and to 
decide upon action necessary in the light of the knowledge that access to 
the W District by the main intake was bJodred by the fall of roof. 
34. The manager and Holland very shortly afterwards returned below 
ground with a canary and on their way inbye met H. Silverthorne. an over­
man; these three went to the fall and there met P. I. McLaughlin. another 
overman, who was captain of the colliery rescue team. They also found 
there a number of other men among whom was B. Rees. a collier in No. 4 
Pit, who was chairman of the colliery lodge of the National Union of Mine­
workers. Some of these men had found two doors in 0.7 Crosscut destroyed 
and had fixed up a temporary door to assist the restoration of ventiJation. 
35. The manager instructed everyone to leave the pit except Holland. 
Silvenhorne and McLaugbJin. who then accompanied him through 0.7 Cross­
cut into the main return. There they tested for firedamp and found up to 
two per cent. in the general body of the air. Some 15 yards inbye of the 
junction of 0.9 renurn, MclJaughlin sa,w that t he canary .had died so the 
party had to retreat. They went back to the fall in the main intake and 
started to make a hole over it. They had just succeeded in doing so when 
rescue teams began to arrive. 
7 
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36. Rescue brigade men from Porth Central Rescue Station and Six Bells 
Colliery went down the pit soon after 1.00 p.m. under the supervision of the 
Superintendent of we Crumlin Rescue Stalion. After setting up a fresh air 
base. these teams at once started exploratory work in which they were later 
supported by two other teams. 
37. The hole over the fall was DOl at first large enough to allow the passage 
of men wearing self-contained breathing apparatus and the first explorations 
were made by way of 0.7 Crosscut and the main return. One team got as 
far as half way along 0.18 face before being forced to retire because the 
, life' of their breathing apparatus was expiring: tbey found a number of 
bodies and observed that the doors on the crosscut near 0.18 unit had been 
blown towards the return. Another team went into 0.9 return but enooun­
tered a fall of roof just inbye of 0.9 Undercast. By the time these nvo teams 
had returned and reported. the hole over the fall in the main intake had been 
enlarged sufficiently to allow the passage of men wearing rescue apparatus. 
Other rescue teams made systematic explorations of all roads and faces. 
They returned to report t.hat the air was stagnant and that there were no • 
survivors. 
THE INVESTIGATION 
Nature and Scale of Examination 
38. Preliminary examination of the affected area failed to disclose any 
obvious igniting cause and indicated that it would be far from easy to 
determine the point of origin of the explosion. The task was, however. 
undertaken in close collaboration by all concerned. National CoaJBoard 
management officials and specialists. Inspectors of the National Union of 
Mineworkers and H.M. Inspectors of Mines and Quarries all played their 
part in a sustained effort, the scale of which was illustrated by evidence 
given that H.M. Inspectors alone spent over 250 shifts at the mine. Scientific 
staff of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment (S.M.R.E.) made a 
meticulous inspection for indications of flame and blast and collected 
numerous samples and specimens for scientific examination in their labora­
tones. All the electrical and mechanical equipment of the district was 
examtned ill situ by specialists -and many items \VeTC sent (or test (IQ the 
S.M.R.E. 
Extent of the Explosion 
39. Microscopic examination of over 500 specimens of dust and fibrous 
material indicated that flame had swept. as shown on Plan No. 3, through 
some 3,000 yards of roadway and each of the faces with the exception of 
0.10. Flame had traversed �he main intake road, both roads serving 0.10. 
most of uhe old 0.9 [erurn. rhe intake of 0.18 and .ts <eturn for 30 y<lrds 
out bye from the face. The main return was affected only locally by flame 
through t.he crosscuts. There were signs of prolonged burning of firedamp 
in two lengrhs of roadway. for 70 yards outbye from 0.10 intake roadhead 
and for about 25 yards outbye from 0.18 return roadhead. 
8 
DirNtions of Propagation 
40. The explosion was not a violent one and [or this reaSOn indications 
of blast were not very prominent. Those disclosed by painstaking investi· 
gation. when considered as a whole. gave the indications shown by the green 
arrows on Plan No. 3. On the main intake there were signs pointing in 
both directions from near the junction with 0.10 intake. The inbye indica· 
lions persisted to and along 0.18 intake and continued along the face. Signs 
in 0.10 intake, on the whole. ""inted outbye from the face. In 0.10 supply 
gate. although the doors at the entrance were blown inbye towards the face. 
there were signs of blast in both directions at the junction of face and road· 
way; in the restricted area of old 0.9 face there were strong signs of blast 
towards the return. The brickwork sides of the 0.9 Undercast were blown in 
directions away from the main intake. the doors in 0.2 Crosscut. in 0.7 
Crosscut and in fthe crosscut near 0.18 unit were aLl bLown nowards the 
return airways. 
41. Specimens of coked dust indicated the directions of flame to have 
been as shown by the red arrows on Plan No. 3. These indications of 
direction were generally consistent with the indications of blast. Minor and 
local contra·indications observed were not at all unusual. There were clear 
si!lJlS that flame entered 1>oth ends of 0.12 face. Coked dust depositions 
found �n 0.10 supply road indicated that flame had travelled from the main 
intake to 0.9 old face and along it 'lo 0.9 return where it died out at about 
200 yards from the face. 
Ventilation Tests 
42. A number of tests were made with the object of determining whether 
any reductions in quantities of air or changes in ventilating pressure would 
lead to the accumulation of firedamp at any point where it was not normally 
found. The amount of ventilation in and near the faces was greatly reduced 
by short·circuiting the main intake and return airways and, in 0.10 unit. 
by blocking the old 0.9 return. The \Tjals were sea.rching and qorolonged 
beyond any likelihood of their duration in practice: some of them were 
deliberately made at a time when the barometric pressure was favourable 
to the appearance of firedamp. Nothing significant emerged. The firedamp 
ceiling in the cavity on 0.10 intake lowered a little; a very thin roof layer 
was detected by probe and methanometer for some distance inbye but this 
firedamp dispersed into the general body of the air long before it reached 
the face. A careful watch was maintained. especially at times when baro· 
metric pressure was falling. close to the inaccessible connection between the 
old 0.9 main gate and the !Marine gob; but there was not at any time an 
indication of firedamp being given off. 
Safety Lamps 
43. The safety lamps found in !he affooted area, forty-eight electric 
cap lamps and eight flame lamps, were examined at the S.M.R.E. Twenty­
nine of the eleotrtic lamps were found to be undanlaged and it was concluded 
that damage sustained by others had resulted from the explosion. Of the 
eight flame lamps, four were undamaged and three were slightly damaged 
!>ut shown by tests to be still safe. One was badly damaged but as this 




44. A police constable who examined the clothing of the victims at the 
surface found an unsmoked c igarette. A. S. JODes. H.M. Jnspector of 
Mines and Quarries, found two live matches in a haversack underground. 
J. T. Thirlaway, area soientist, during investigations .in the district, eXaJuined 
a polythene bottle and found ;nside it a plastic bag tied to the stopper by 
a thread. L. G. Fear, H.M. Senior District In�pector of Mines and Quarries. 
and members of his staff made further extensive and intensive searches for 
contraband in the diSlr;cl but with negative results. 
Roadway Dust Samples 
45. An examination of coUiery records sho\\ed that the procedure 
followed in taking and testing roadway dust sam ples before the explosion 
was in order except that samples were nol taken during the m onths of 
December. 1959, and April. 1960. No explanation was given for the 
omission 10 December, but the man whose duty it was to take samples in 
Apri l  said that he "as prevented from doing so by his daily preoccupation 
with the ventilation of 0.18 unit. 
46. Forty-four samples were oollected on 21s t June, one week before the 
explosion. and 41 of tl'hese were found to contain over 80 per cent. of 
incombu tible maller. The other three, aJl taken in the vicinity of the 
rnam loading point. contained. respectively, 57, 70 and 75·6 per cen t. of 
incombustible matter. The volatile maller of the coal worked was less 
than 25 per cent. so that the management could, had they notified H.M. 
Inspeotoif3te to that effect. have cst:.:tblished 60 as the minimum percentage 
of incombustibJe matter req,u.ired to be maintained. They had not done 
so 3nd rhus. by regu lation. a minimum percentage of 75 automaticalJy 
applied. 
47. C. A. Bilton. 1-I.M. Inspector of Mines and QU'arries. collected six 
s amples on 17th May. 1960. from places where he considered the combustible 
content likely lO be highest-two just inbye the m ain loading point, rwo 
just inbye rhe transfe r point from 0.18 gate tn!lt to the tnmk belt and two 
in 0.18 return immediatcly outbyc the roadhead. Analyses of these samples 
showed that four contained morc than 75 per cent. of incombustible matter. 
The other two contained more than 70 per cent. but less than 75 pe.r cent. 
and H.M. Senior District Inspector. in corr espondence. dr6\1/ the attention 
of the management to these results : he was assUIed that the zones con­
cerned had been re-treated and that the results of re-sampl ing had been 
satisJaClory. 
48. The results of post-eXI)losion roadway dust sampling and onalysis 
are indicated on Plan No. 4. The m ajor ity of these samples contained 
less than 75 per cent. of incombustible maUer : of the 64 samples taken in 
conveyor roads 29 contained more Ihan 60 per cenl. but less than 75 per cent.. 
and 29 contained less than 60 per cent. The discrepancy belwun the results 
of pre--explosion and post-expJosion samples will be commented upon later. 
Mechanical Apparatus 
49. K. S. Worth ington. H,M. lnspeclor of Mechanical Engineering, made 
a critical examination of the mechanical apparatus in W District and of 
ail oompressing machinery on the surface. The standard of installation and 
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maintenance was genem.lly satisfactory. There were some mmOT defects 
but none of t.hem contributed to the explosion. 
50. A hole iu a compressed air pipe had been repaired by paper and 
hemp rope, a malpractice which could cause a fire. A wooden plug was 
found 10 have been driven into a hole i n  \lhe compressed aiir supply main 
about 40 yards from the roadhead of 0.10 intake ; the plug showed very 
sligh.t \Signs of heat but �his had appa.rently been caused by the explosion. 
Three oompressed air pipe joints made with rubber ifingS were found to be 
' blowing ' ratber badly on 0.12 face, but laboratory examination of the 
rubber showed no sign of frictional heating. 
5 1 .  The 0 . 1 0  stage-loader driving mOlar lSituated about 30 yards from 
the face of the ,intake was found to be filted with an aJuminium alloy fan 
and cowU. 1lhe oowl ha.d been fractured but the cracl1S did not seem 
to have been freshly produced, nor were there any recently-made indentations 
or arbrusions. Some of uhe steel wires of the mesh guard covering the air 
inlet in the cowl had at some time fowed the roots of the fan bJades, 
bu.t Lhe rubbed surfaces were not new. The fan was found 10 be free­
running and without end play on the motor shaft, which might have allowed 
the fan to Tub against the wires or other surface. 
52. The haulage engine in 0.10 supply gate was found with the throttle 
valve partly open, the brake off and reverse gear engaged : the rope ' lead ' 
was underneath the drum, instead of above as it normally was. An empty 
suppJy tram was found a.t �ts outbye terminus between the two doors in 
0.10 supply gate. Tlh.e haulage CQpe connected to i t  was 'Very slack and a 
" barhook " (backstay) was attached 10 and beneath 'he tram as though 
it had been over..,ridden. It was suggest'ed uhat the haulage engine might 
have been running in reverse gear at the time of Ithe explosi'On and that 
it continued to do so until the pressure of air fell after a breakage of 
pipes ca used by ,the explosion. Tests carried out after the explosion showed 
that when the engine was Jeft running after the ,tram had reached the 
outbye end of the road the spaTe rope stayed slack on the drum until 
h was caught up and coiled in the opposite direction. Old indentations on 
a girder 'of rthe haulage firamework indicated that at some time the rope 
had coiled beneath tlhe drum. The evidence that the engine might have 
reen running was tenuous as 'the ·VhroLtle lever might easily have been 
moved eiuher in rthe explosion or accidentally I3.fterW3Jfds ; in any event, 1 am 
satisfied that incendive sprurks would nat have been produced. 
Electrical Apparatus 
53. A. L. Alexander, H.M. Electrioal Inspector of Mines and Quarries. 
and Ch.ief Testing Office", of 1'be S.M.R.E. inspected all elOCl!rical apparatus 
in position and 95 items were sent to uhe S.M.R.E. ,for further oritical 
examinations and te9ts. The apparatus was found to comply with the 
certified designs and, apart from minor defects. ,to have been weIJ maintained. 
54. Every flameproof enclosure was twice subjected to test to find 
whether. under the most stringent conditions. an explosion of firedamp ilb 
air within jt wouJd ignite a su.rrounding inflammable mixture of firedamp' 
in air. The external inflammable atmosphere was not jgnited in any of ,tihe 
124 tests made. 
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55. The telephone and signa1ting appliances were tested for intrinsic 
safety in methane-air mixtures. Some items had been damaged by the 
explosion but the tests showed that an adequate margin of safety had 
existed under working conditions. 
56. The romote control circuits associated with eight of the gate-end 
switches controlling the conveyor motors were certified as intrinsically safe 
in 1939. but have since been found. when tested by a more modern method, 
to be capable of igniting methane. In seven of the circuits used, however. 
the remote control cables were found intact and the remote control 
enclosures were proved to be flameproof. In the remaining circuit, the 
remote control switch housings were flameproof but the connecting cable 
was damaged : the damage. however. was such that sparking could not have 
occurred. 
57. A single-shot exploder found in 0 . 1 8  return was tested and found 
lO conform to its approval specification. The wire-armoured roadway 
cables were examined underground and tested a t  a voltage oonsidorably 
higher than the working voltage without disclosing any defect liable to 
cause open sparking. All the fle.'(ible cables in use were examined at the 
'Surface I3nd tested a t  Q voltage considerably rin excess of rthe working voltage, 
again without disclosing any defect whkh could have given rise to open 
sparking. 
58. Tests were carried out on the two .• Venturi " tubes to determine 
whether or not they could have accumulated an electrostatic charge sufficient 
to cause an ignition. These tests were made i n  conditions far more con­
ducive to the development of such a charge than those likely to have 
been present in the pit, but the maximum charges developed were not 
capable of igniting firedamp. 
TilE CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSION 
Point of Origin and Spread of the Explosion 
59. F. J. Hartwell. a Senior Principal Scien(ific Officer of (he S.M.R.E .. 
said that the indications of the directions of blast and flame suggested 10 
him that the explosion started in the vicinity of 0.10 intake road head ; 
at this road head there appeared to be a zone of small disturbance in which 
little dust was raised but relatively prolonged burning of rich firedamp 
had occurred. The heavy burning observed on timber close to the ripping 
lip indicated slow burning at that point ; because of the gradient of the 
road. any accumulation of firedamp would have been thickest at the f�ce 
of the ripping and this view was consistent with the degree of scorchmg 
of timber seen at floor leveJi there. Had the explosion originated anywhere 
but at the 0 . 1 0  intake road head. the flame would certainly have been forced on 
to 0.10 face and this had not occurred. Taking into acoount the probable 
concentration of the firedamp and the fact that the flame reached the floor. 
he estimated that the amount of pure methane present at the time of the 
explosion was between 150 and 200 cubic feet. This quantity would have 
been enough to produce the violence necessary to raise coal dust farther 
outbye in 0.10 intake. He considered that tbe explosion subsequently w�s 
one mainly of coal dust. principally that raised from conveyors for It 
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died OUl on the tram haulage section of the main intake and on tbe main 
rerum. T.he prolonged bunning at 0.18 retum roadhead could ol>ly have 
been due to the inflammation of firedamp from open breaks. togetber with 
soone from the adjacent waste. The signs of extra violence found near 
0.10 supply road head might have been due to firedamp forced out of the 
waste by the explosion i n  the intake. 
60. Hanwell had carefully considered. and put forward tentatively, a 
possible atIternative theory visualising that a preliminary ignition might 
have occuned at 0.10 supply roadhead, itlhat fla.me then passed bhroug'h nhe 
waste to ignite gas in 0.10 intake roadhead, and that this ;n turn caused 
rhe coal dust explosion. In a number of cases flame has been proved to 
have travelled long distances in open breaks across wastes. But to 
satisfy the theory in this case it was necessary to postulate either tbat the 
ignition at the supply road head coincided with the accumulation of firedamp 
at the intake road head, or that the ignition in the supply road head forced 
firedamp, not on to the [ace, but by some means into the intake roadhead. 
where it was virtually unmixed with air when reached by the flame. Neither 
of these hypotheses seemed likely. He, therefore. -adhered to the opinion 
that the explosion started in 0.10 in1'ake 'foadhead. 
61. With one exception, to which I shall refer later, mining experts of 
the National Coal Board. the National Union of Mineworkers and H.M. 
Inspectorate all agreed with this view. 
62. There was not immediately apparent in this location the necessary 
coincidence of an incendive agency and a source of firedamp in quantiry 
sufficient upon ignition to raise and ignite coal dust. Even so, careful 
consideration of the possibilities ,leads me to accept 0.10 intake roadhead 
as the most likely place of origin of the explosion. 
Source of Firedamp 
63. The fact that firedamp had not been found in the 0.10 intake 
ripping since 9th !May--.some seven wee.k.s before the explosion---suggested 
that something unusual must have happened to cause the accumulation 
there of about 150 cubic feat 'Of firedamp i n  a period mot longer lhan the 
five hours or so whioh elapsed bebween the ni&lht shift deputy's examina­
tion at about 5.30 a.m. and the explosion. Firedamp persisted a[(er the 
explosion. For example. two days later H. L. S .  Iohnston. Under-manager 
of bhe No. 4 P,it, observed one and a half per cent. midway up botlh 0.10 
intake and 0.10 supply gate. The ventilation had not then been restored 
and so a large emission of firedamp is not necessary to accou.nt for 
10hnston's observation. The possibility arose of firedamp having migrated 
to the road head by layering along the roof of the roadway from the 
large cavity some 100 yards outbye on this road but. in the light of the 
ventilation tests made afterwards, I conclude that it was unJikely to have 
happened. Tests in boreholes later drilled into the roof between the cavity 
and the ripping did not indicate any substantial flow along breaks or bed 
separation ohannels. 
64. Another possibility was that the firedamp reached the road head 
as a consequence of displacement of firedamp by a large fall of roof in the 
waste. In all probability any firedamp in the waste would normally be 
confined to the upper and return end of it  and, even if there had been such 
a fall, firedamp would not have been forced out to the road head. 
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65. More likely than the displacement of already released firedamp is 
the opemng of new channels for firedamp emission. perhaps from the ' rider ' 
coal. by ground movement There are many recorded cases of large feeders 
of firedamp having issued quickly. but such feeder..s have usually been 
associated with obviously abnorma l  ground movement and have not been 
short-lived. The investigations after the explosion discovered neither such 
ground movements nor a substantial feeder. There could. however. have 
been enough extra roof movement to create new channels for a slow issue of 
fuedamp close to the road head itself. J .  Grindle, a repairer, spoke of 
the appearance of bed separation at the roadhead the day before the 
explosion and R .  H. Law observed it after the shoLfiri.ng on the night 
shift. A possible reason for a change in conditions at the roadhead was 
put forward by L. G. Fear, who drew attention to the existence of a 
small fault in tbe Marine workings the Line of whkh, if continued . would 
have passed through the roadhead, and to a change of strata inclination 
near the roadhead. Another possibiliry is that the pi llar of coal between 
0.10 face and the Ma.rine workings, h3v ing been reduced to aboUl 55 yards 
in widlh. must have been heavily loaded and so in a condition conducive 
10 extC1 roof movement at its edges. 
66. J wink it probable that the firedamp accumulated slowly from 
small feeders close to the road head. With an airflow of 5.000 cubic feel 
per minute in this twelve feet arched roadway. the velocity near the roof 
would have been very low and it i s  unlikely that, in the absence of a 
sheet, the air 'Would Ihave swopl away any suoh '3ccumulation. There is no 
reason. however, to suppose that it bad reached proponions detectable on 
a flame lamp when uhe pre-shift inspection was made at 5.30 a.m. I was 
impressed at the Inquiry by the fact that, although firedamp appeared quite 
frequently, it  was not suggested tbat the deputies had ever failed to make 
proper examinations or to take appropriate steps when they found it . 
V. Hard ing. the deputy for 0.10 unit. who \-vas killed . may weU have 
examined the place. probably in the beginning of his shift. and 1 fee l sure 
that had he found an appreciable quantity of firedamp in {he ripping he 
would at least have erected a brallice sheet. Even so. and allowing for 
slight dispersiorT. an issue into Lhe ripping of liwe more than one cubic 
fOOl of firedamp per minute frolll 1.30 a.l11. onwards would have beefl 
sufficient to produce t!he minimum of 150 cubic feet that Hartwell estimated 
to have been 'involved in the beginning of the explosion. 
Means of Ignition 
67. The results of the investigation discount as possible causes of ignition 
the safety lamps and the eloou-icaJ and mechan ical plant used. Of the 
known possible causes of ignjtion there remain for consideration the illegal 
use of a naked name for smoking. shotflring and frictional sparking. 
Contraband 
68. I have oonsidercd carefully the possibility imp�ed by the finding 
of an unsmoked cigarette, t.wo live matches and a plastic bag, but 1 am 
satisfied that the explosion was Dot cansed by the sLrilcing of a match 
either accidentaUy or by someone trying to smoke. The point of ignition 




69. Preliminary consideration of an igniting agent pointed to rhe possi­
bility of a ' hanging ftame ' from shotfiring and L. R .  James, Head of 
the Safety Deparunent, National Union of Mineworker<. South Wales Area, 
remained of the opinion that lruS was bhe roost LikeJy cause o[ the ignition. 
The round of four shots fired in Idle roof ri.pping near the face of 0.10 
intake roadhead at about 3.00 a.m. on the previous night shift could 
conceivably have ignited a continuous feeder of gas in a bed separation or 
other break. Such a ' hanging flame ' sometimes-fortunately only rarely 
-{�OI1.linues to burn and could cause an explosion shouJd a minure of air 
and firedamp move upon it. The omission of stemming from the back of 
the shotboles riD 0.10 lintake face rippings would have i ncreased the risk 
of ignition in a roof break a little beyond the end of the Ihole and 
therefore undetectable. It seems probable that bed separation evident after 
the eXlplosion was present to some extent before nhe shots were fired and 
that there would have been some firedamp in the overlying beds. Plate ] 
and Plan No. 5 both relate t o  this ripping as it appeared some time after 
the explosion when the investig.ation focussed attention on that place ; by 
that ,time !the fore-poling had beon advanced. 
70. A search of British records of ' hanging flame ' incidents disclosed 
reports of 24 cases since 1934. Six of these arose from shots fired in coal. 
[n ripping shots, which aTe fewer in number but far more dangerous. there 
were seventeen recorded instances of ' hanging flame ' in the 26 years. 
Three of these could not be closely located from the information given, but 
it seerlled that thirteen others occurred a�ter the firing of shots in return 
roadhcads. The ouly ignition which led to a disaster was also the only 
-one which occurred in an intake road. This was at NonLlt Gawber Colliery 
in 1935[1].* ]n this case the intake road was. however. at the rise end 
-of a face and near a partly-closed a irway leading to a face ;n advance of it. 
7 1 .  In none of these Or.1.SeS did ignition occur in conditions similar to 
those which obtained in 0.10 intake roadhead. It is difficult to visualise 
circumstances in which firedamp .in quantity suRicient to account for the 
eJCplosion could. over a period of seven hOllrs or so. have aocumulated 
i n  the ripping without reaGhing a flame 1e1it from shotfiring. unless the 
fianle was in a bed separation break in lhe lower part of the ripp.ing. That 
was perhaps possible but T do not th ink -it at all probable. 
Frictional Ignition 
72. Many witnesses described sparks which were sometimes produced 
either when the wedg� were knocked out of the clamps of fdation props 
or Toof bar joints. or when released props. in falling. struck supports 
still in position. It is well known that sparks may result in this way 
or from operations such as LIte striking of the edge of a prop with a 
hammer. A great deal of investigation, -however. !has failed vo s-how that 
sparks liable to cause ignition of firedamp are produced by this kind 
of steel·to-steel contact. There is no 'history of any such ig.nition. 
73. Sparks, or more properly frictional heatings. resulting from impact 
involving certain kinds 01 rock, however, are dangerous. Firedamp can be 
ignited when. in machine cutting. the picks strike quartzitic rock or 
• The nwnbers in square brackets refer to the Bibliography al Appendix IV. 
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pyrites. Nothing of the sor,l could have happened in dus explosion. 
however, as the machines had not been cutting for some time before. 
74. Firedamp may be ignited by a panticular ,type of blow from a 
sleel band-pick on some kinds of rock. Seven such cases were recorded in 
1930 in a Safety in Mines Research Board Paper by M. J. Burgess and 
R.  B. Wheelerl!!], who were able to obtain ignitions in the laboratory. 
More recently. the SJM.R.E. Ihas designed an apparatus to simulate 
mechanically the type of blow that causes ignition with a hand-pick. Tests 
were made in an  explosive abmosphere with samples of quartzitic sandstone 
libat had 'been exposed in the roof of 0.10 innake roadhead. as indicated 
in Plan No. 5. FIO"ur jgn:itions were obtained in six tests, during which 
the rock surfaces were struck a total of 1 30 blows. A specimen of rock 
from the roof of 0. 10 supply roadhead containing an intrusion comparable 
to rrha.t of the rock iin 0.10 tinttake roadhoo.d was also tested and an ignition 
was obtained after aboul 200 impacts. At the time of the explosion. the 
only place where Ithe quartzitic rock might have been struck witlh a hand­
pick was at 0.10 supply roadhead. HartweU. in evidence. discussed the 
possibility that firedamp was ignited there but. for reasons already given. 
this seems highly unlikely. 
75. The S.M.R.E. has also exanlined me possibility of ignition of fire­
damp by friction between rock and rook. The results of tests by Burgess 
and 'Wheeler were reported on in 1928[51. Other tests of this kind have 
been made recently and reported on in S.M.R.E. Annual Report fOT 
1959(4]. The apparatus used consi.sts of a rock ' slider ' which is pressed 
wiuh known force against the periphery of a rotating rock Yt11eel in an 
explosive atmosphere ; the pressure between the .surfaces is measured and 
,the time between 1Ihe application of 'he load and any ignition of firedamp 
is taken. 19nirion has been obtamed with quartzitic rock. The greater the 
speed of the wheel and the Jonger the duration of the friction. the more 
likely h is (0 occur. 
76. Hrom ,the experiments it is deduced l.'hat. to produce an jncendive 
condition, a suitable rock would first have to fall a distance sufficient to 
gain the necessary speed and illhen slide some distance on another rock ; 
the shorter the fall of the rock. the longer would have to be the slide. 
77. I thave carefuUy examined Irhe available .records of ignitions believed 
to be due either to the impact of rock on rock or of rock on steel ; the 
latter must. in the nanure of things. jnclude the possibility that the 
incendive impact may have been between rocks. The subject is of such 
importance that 1 have summarised t'he records i n  Appendix  m. Four of 
�he explosions referred to occurred in Canada. So fa!' as this coun.try is 
concerned. six of Lhe seven instances merutioned were in sou� Wales. Sir 
Henry Walker. then Ohief Inspector at Mines. in his report on the Marine 
Colliery disaster in 1 927(6], considered that the explosion may have been 
due ilO a stone falHng on stone. He cited as supporting evidence for 
this view possible sintilar incidents which bad occurred between 1896 and 
1 927 at Maindy. Femdale and Lletty Shenkin Collieries. In more recent 
years. other incidents have occurred at Cwm Colliery in 1 949[8) and at 
Lewis Merthyr Colliery in 1956171. 
78. It seems clcar ,ha •• if quartzitic rock faUs and strikes either a steel 
object or possibly pieces of similar rock witlh sufficient impact. an inccocfjve 
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condition may resull. Hartwcll suggested that Lhe impact of the mechanised 
pick used in the experiments he described would have been about equivalent 
to that of rock weighing 260 lbs. falling for a distance of .three and a half 
feet onto a SIeel objeot. He thought that the most probable cause of the 
explosion was that there was a faU of rock bringing down with it firedaJ11p 
that had accumulated at the ripping and that one of the larger pieces 
of rock st'I'uck the canopy in suoh a way as to produce an incendive 
condition and so cause infIanunation of the surrounding atmosphere. Pieces 
of quartzitic ,ock, the largest being estimated to weigh about 240 Ibs. were. 
in fact, found on the ground and on the canopy under 0.10 intake ripping 
(plate 1). Some of it could have fallen a distance of six feet. 
79. 1lhe mechanics of firedamp being brought down from near the roof 
by faJ.J.ing 5tone and then mixing with atir have been demonstrated with 
perspex models, made at the Buxton Station of the S.M.R.E., of the road­
heads at which the explosions occurred at Lewis Mertbyr .colliery and 
at Sutton Colliery in 1957(8). 1 commend to all mining engineers the film 
which has been made 1:0 il ustrate these demonstrations. 
80. The evidence was not complete1y 5atisfying, but I incline to the 
view ,that firedamp was brought down by � fall of roof and was ignited 
by frictional heat at the point of impact between a. quartzjtic stone and 
tihe steel girder forming the (OP of one side of We canopy. I refer later 
to methods of minimising the risks associated with falls of hard rock 
lirom a high cavity and from near the face of high rippings. 
8 1 .  If a fall of stone of a not uncommon nature for a distance of six 
feet or so may be dangerous, .rhe question immediately raised is the degree 
of risk involved in the routine collapse of roof ,in wastes. There is. however. 
no recorded experience of ignJtJion of firedamp from this cause in longwaU 
\V3Stes in this country. This may weU be because, for ignition to occur, 
there must be nhe remote coincidence of a number of conditions including 
,the fall of a oertain kind of rock, the right type and strength of impact 
and the presence 3!t or about the point of impaot of a firedamp...aiT mixture 
within a relatively narrow range. 
82. Tlbe following questrions seem to require particular atlention : whether 
the conditions of the tests. with frequent pick: blows in ,the same place. 
resemble what can OCCur in practice : .to what extent such impacts can be 
related to Ithe .impact of f-aIling stone ; whellher the revolving wheel test 
provides reliable data upon which to found conclusions regarding failing 
stone ; to what extent the �gnitlion Ihazard lis -affected by .tbe mass of tbe 
falling stone and its ve.locily ; wheLher Ithere �s some peculiasity in the 
mines in South Wales, such <as We nature of stone. which may account for 
the preponderance theTe of these ignitions. All lIhese problems, together 
wit'b others relating to fuictional ,ignition, are the subject of 'research at the 
S.M.R.E. and mere can be no doubt as to the ,importance of trhis work. 
A Minority View 
83. A. Davies, a National Union of Mineworkers' Inspector, advanced 
the weory that the explosion started as a result of the firing of a ripping 
shot i n  0. 1 8  return roadhead, which ris illustrated in Plate H. The well­
kept records of explosive issued and returned showed that a detonator and 
a pound of explosive, issued to tJhe doputy of 0. 1 8  'Unit 'On the morning 
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of the explosion. were not recovered afterwards. Davies thought that a 
shot may have been fired i n  the right hand side of vhe nipping just before 
the explosion. that this may have ignited firedamp which had continued to 
burn and that the deputy and others were at the time of the explosion fetching 
stone dust in order LO put out the flame. 1 saw nothing i n  this p1ace to 
lead me to think Ithat a shot containing as much as one pound of ex'plosive 
might have been fired in the ripping. It seemed to me far more probable 
that the missing explosive had been f\J.Sed i n  the coal near the ribside 
for there were large lumps which had apparently been ' turned back ' a 
sufficient distance from the face to make a track for the ooal cuLting D1c1chine. 
It would have been a very reasonable thing for the cuttennan. who had 
onJy to sqll<1lrC out the end of .me face on this shift, first to cut enough 
coal at the corner for such a shot and then cut again. There was a supply of 
stone dust very near the ripping. But the conclusive evidence against 
the theory advanced was tbat, if an ignition had taken place in 0. 1 8  roadhead, 
the direction of flame would have been completely contrary to the indications 
found. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Contraband and Searching 
84. The statutory requirements rdating to tbe systematic search of 
underground workers for smoking materials had nOl been carried out at the 
No. 5 Pit since February. 1 959. when the workmen who had been carrying 
out the searching ceased to do so because of a matter of payment. The 
manager said that he had then 3f1ranged for under-officials to search 
instead. It came to his notice a fortnight before the explosion that his 
arrangements had broken down. He thereupon confirmed his earlier 
instructions to the under-officials but there was no evidence of any tollow-up 
action to see that these were observed ; after the explosion. i t  was dis­
covered that they had not been. The manager is. of course, responsible for 
ensuring the observance of the arrangements for searching and for securing 
that when these arrangements are not i n  operation no person goes below 
ground. But I think that others. upon reflection. may not feel satisfied 
that they did all they might have done i n  the maUer. 
85. Searching is very necessary as a constant reminder against careless­
ness and. where it  is done efficienliy. i t  can be a deterrent to those who 
might otherwise wilfully attempt 10 take smoking materials below ground. 
I was particularly disturbed by the evidence that smoking materials had 
been taken below ground at Six Bells Colliery and was shocked to find no 
dissent from the implication that the plastic bag found in the water bottle 
was a provision intended hy someone at some time to defeat a searcher 
with the object of smoking below ground. 
Roof Support 
86. The general standard of roof control on 0. 1 0  face was good. The 
seam roof at the intake road bead was not insecure but the system of support 
at this place. and the implementation o( it, left something to be desired. 
The system of support could with advantage have incorporated the use of 
chocks. The hydraulic props used were eminently suitable for use at 
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road heads but the prop density there was less tban on the remainder of 
the face ; additional supports should have been set at  the margins of 
ground to be brought down by shotfiring. Long experience has shown a 
need for more than average density of supports at roadbeJds, especially 
where, as in this case. there is a machine stable which increases the distance 
from pack to face. The enlarged. view on Plan No. 2 shows that tbe 
packs were not completed as close to tbe face as they should have been. 
a matter of prime importance at road heads. Similar criticisms apply to 
the support of 0 . 1 8  relurn road head. 
87. Intensive support of the road bead is particularly necessary when, as 
in 0 . 1 0  intake. the road is along a coal rib. Roof settlement over Ibe 
coal rib may not be arrested but it  is delayed and the higher rate of 
sellllemem over the packs must result in sharp deflection of the roof at 
the ribside, with the risk of extensive fracturing there. Because the higher 
beds are lbetter supported at the ribside, the lowering of tbe immediate 
roof above the roadway tends to the formation of bed separation there. 
The advantages Jnd disadvantages of the practice of forming roads along 
the ribside, and the necessary precautions if roads are so situated, are fully 
considered and well documented in a report issued in 1952 by the National 
Coal Board's South Western Divisional Committee on Strata Control{9J. 
88. Some months before the explosion the roadway had met the faults. 
The roof had not then been held and tbe consequence had been the large 
cavity. A proper standard of roof control and suppOrt a t  road heads should 
ordinarily prevent the development of cavities. Where they do occur. 
perhap in association with a seam abnormality, their extent can be limited 
by improved support at and ahead of the rippings. Many cavities develop 
between the last-set arch and [he 'ripping face where the usual method of 
initial support of the newly exposed roof is by fore-paling. Even where tltis 
is carried out weH its effectiveness depends upon the resistance of the 
supports, usually steel arches. wbich carry the straight girder . poles '. 
Recently-set arches, especially those incorporating means of accommodat­
ing the inevitable height loss. are often lightly loaded and a comparatively 
small load on the ·ad vancing end of a fore-pole can cause the inbye sup­
porting arch 10 lower and thus produce a magnified drop at the end of the 
pole. There is need for tbe development of better practice in fore-poling 
and of means whereby road supports, though capable of accommodating 
height loss, offer greate'f resistance when newly set, at the lime when 
support from �hem is most valuable. 
89. In rool conditions which predispose cavily 'formation at road beads. 
the original excavation may be made smal1er. and tbus easier to control. 
by the adoption of the pilot method of roadway formation. ln this method. 
which is  not uncommon in South Wales, a s.mall roadway is taken near the 
face and a larger one made a short distance outbye. Alternatively. where 
the floor is not liable to excessive heave. unduly thick roof rippings may 
be avoided by floor ripping or by a combination of roof and floor ripping. 
as was adopted in 0 . 1 8  intake. The development of mechanical, perhaps 
pneumatic, means of conveying stone from the excavation to the pack 
spaces in either of these systems would be ve.ry helpful ; much more difficult 
problems in mining engineering have been successfully overcome. The 
desirability or otherwise of adopting either of these ahernatives would fall 
to be determined in the light of all  the circumstances. 
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90. Most cavities are small to begin with and special measures taken 
in good time may halt their extension. If. however, a road head cavity is 
allowed to extend as the roadway advances, it may become vinua11y 
unmanageable. A stage must arise in the development of such a cavity 
when it is necessary 10 SlOp the face so that proper measures may be 
taken to prevent its further development. The identification of such a stage 
is the concern of al l  officials : the decision, except in emergency. may 
be a function of the senior management of the colliery. 
9 1 .  Another problem which requires consideration is whether, once a 
large cavity has formed, i t  should either he filled or othenvise suJ>POTlted 
and kepl ventilated. This again is a matter of judgment in each case, but 
geDerally speaking. filling is to be preferred. The meaDS of filling large 
cavities have been much improved recently. 1 n  his repon for 1958[101, H.M. 
Inspector of Mines and Quanries for the South Western Division refOlied 
to the fillling of roof cavities fby IPneumatlic stowing with material fed into 
a crusher-SlOwer situated beneath the cavity. More recently. H. Wdghl, 
in a PapertlIJ has described how cavities may be filled by pumping into 
them a light-weight compressible material. J hope tha t managements will. 
in a ppropriate circumstances, give careful consideration to the adoption 
of such methods of filling cavities. In weak ground. faUs of stone will 
generaJJy ooncinuc i n  any cavity not completely supported until . 1n time. 
the void is largely filled. But it must be borne well in Dlind that before 
then there is some risk of firedamp being expelled from the cavity or even 
igniled therein by a large fall of gtone. 
Firedamp Determinations 
92. The firedamp coDtent of the general body of the air at lhe statutory 
point of determination had on occasions exceeded one per cent., but the 
manager had failed to give notice of these results to H.M. lnspoctornte. 
There were also a number of irreguJa rities in connection with the making 
and recxHti ing of determinations. Some of the results had not been entered 
in ,the book provided at rhe colliery for the purpose and some of !hose 
recorded referred to detenninations made at times other than the laner 
part of a culting shift. There was no record for 0 . 1 2  unit. 
93. The person responsible to lhe manager for making firedamp det.er­
minations and taking air measurements was not solely concerned with 
ventilation . He was responsible also for the oollectioo of roadway dust 
samples and for monthly examinations of fire-fighting equipment. When 
difficulties with firedamp were encountered in 0 . 1 8  unit. he had insufficient 
time to give proper attention to all his duties. Nevertheless. the deficiencies 
and irregularities should have been avoided. Careful consideration of 
these and related matters led me to the conclusion that the manager might 
have been greatly assisted by the employment at the colliery of a ventilation 
specialist who could. if necessary, have devoted an his time to this work. 
The .• Bryan " Report recommended that .. local management, when con­
fronted with difficult ventilation problems. should take advaDtage of the 
expert advice which should a lways he available within .the National Coal 
Board ". Something more now seems to he necessary In the clirect.OIl of 
provid ing such continuous expert attention to the ventilarion of each mine 
as may be necessary to prevent difficulties arising. Consideration of this 
20 
suggestion could well form part of a wider concept which Sir Andrew Bryan 
bad in mind when, in his closing address on behalf of the National Associa· 
tion of Colliery Managers and the British AssociaLoOIl of Colliery Manage· 
ment. he suggested that there was a need for operationaJ researoh to 
discover ways and means of improving ,the effectiveness of the large man­
power now employed in the field of safeLy. 
Firedamp Detection 
94. A number of the persons carrying flame safety lamps had not been 
trained 'and certified in -their use. Unsuccessful attempts bave been made 
at many mines Ita persuade workmen to Ibecome qualified and 10 carry 
and use firedamp detootoI'S. I understand Ibat a payment for carrying and 
using them has now been arranged and J hope that Lhe last has been 
heard of ,these difficulties. 
95. It was suggested at the Inquiry that deputies should be provided 
with methanorneters and probes for examining places otherwise inaccessible 
to them. I feel sure that there is a case for Lhe wider use of these aids 
by ventilation officers in speciaJ investigation work-one aspect of whioh 
I ·shall refer 1X> later-but not, for the time being at any rate. by deputies 
in routine inspections. I would, however, agree entirely with a suggestion 
that deputies should be provided. as soon as possible, WiLh a better means 
of exanlinjng for firedamp in high places, not only because it js difficult 
for them ID reach the roof of suob places with their lamps, but! because 
il  is known Itbat present types of lamps may not give accurate indications 
of trun roof layers. Flame safety lamps so equipped that a sample may 
be brought down <rom the mof .to the lamp by an aspirMor and a tube 
are becoming available. and the National Coal Board as carrying out corn­
pJemen.tary development work with a view to producing a flame lamp 
detector which will give direct and imprOVed perlormance in the detection 
of very rhin layers. 
Emission of Firedamp 
96. The 0.18 face was advancing into an area nOt likely to have been 
drained of firedamp to any appreciable eXitent by previous workings ; the 
nearest seam extracted was the upper 'leaf of the Black Vein, some 60 yards 
above. A fairly substantial firedamp emission was tIhereiore to be expected 
and did in fact occur. When last Oleasured before the explosion. the 
quantity of air in the return airway was 9,450 cub.ic feet per minute, and 
it comained one per cent. of firedamp at a point 30 (eet from the face. The 
, make ' of firedamp was thus about 94 cubic feet per minute. Firedamp 
appearances were quite frequent, mainly in the antake ripplngs, the highest 
pomlt in the unit. until rthe thickness of the roof ripping was reduced from 
six feet to three feet by the substitution of eight feet arches for the uwelve 
feet 3!Cches prevjously used and by taking some Hoor tripping. 
97. The ' make ' of firedamp in 0.10 unit was small-less than 1 7  cubic 
feet per minute when last calculated lbe£ore the eXlpJosion ; the percentage 
of fi'redamp at the return end of the face was only one-quarter of ODe 
per cent. Nevertheless, firedamp was quite rfrequenrty re:portleld Iby �he 
deputies mainly at or near the �eturn end of the face. 
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Firedamp Drainage 
98. It was suggested at the Inquiry that had a system of firedamp drain. 
age by boreholes over the gob been practised this accident m.ight have 
been averted. ] do not find the evidence strong enough for me to subscribe 
to this view, but 1 consider it  very likely that had such a system been adopted 
in 0.18  unit i t  would have saved many people a great deal of trouble and 
anxiety. The National Union of Mineworkers' lodge chairman was apparently 
concerned, because of hoLfiring. about the appearances of firedamp i n  0. 1 8  
unit and he discussed this with the manager on at least one occasion just 
before the explosion. Long before this, however, the manager and, indeed, 
the group manager, had demonstrated their concern by taking part in special 
methanometer surveys. 
99. The adoption of firedamp drainage was considered by the manage· 
ment. 1 think that this unit was one i n  which firedamp drainage might well 
have been adopted. It could conceivably have been much more effective 
than the local air deflection measures taken. by assisting the naturally buoyant 
firedamp to rise to the drainage holes and so away from the edges of the 
working. One of the objections advanced by the area ventilation engineer 
was that. for successful drainage. holes would have had 10 be bored from 
the intake road as well as from the return. This would not necessarily 
have been the case. There are many examples of firedamp drainage from 
the return side only and on faces longer than i n  0.18 unit. An ascentional 
ventilation lay-out. although not called for by other considerations. might 
have simplified the problem here but there are instances of successful drainage, 
with proper precaulions, from intakes. 
100. Firedamp drainage could well be. in some conditions, one of the 
best ways of minimising dangerous emissions from the waste. The very 
importaot Section 56 (2) Cb) of the Mines and Quarries Act. 1954. imposes 
upon managers the duty of securing that appropriate steps are taken [or this 
purpose. The waste conditions can only be ascertained by investigation 
such as is made. for instance. in the gassier seams of North Staffordshire 
where venliJalion officers regularly observe the firedamp content near roof 
level in the accessible wastes by means of methanometers and probes. I 
strongly recommend procedures which have been set out in papers by 
R. H. Clough and J. Carverll!!] and by E. Steele and D. C. YatesP.f.J .  
Air Velocities 
101 . The 0. 10 unit made less than one-fifth of the amount of firedamp 
given off in 0. 1 8  'Unit but the air quantIity was -also �ess by -about one..Jtalf. 
The velocity of air on 0.10 face was of the 'Order of 100 feet per minute 
God .thus substantially 'below the fl,gure of 1 50 feet per minute recom· 
mended originally as a dust preventive measure in Ithe Third Report of the 
Research Committee of the Monmouthshire and South Wales Coal Owners' 
Association[l2J, and subsequently qUOled by the National Coal Board as 
desirable for faces in new and recoDStTuoted collieries. The air velocity 
on the face is, of course, generaJly relatoo to the velocity in the .road ways 
serving the face ; in thin seams a face velocity of 150 feet per minute 
might mean a low velocity in the roadway, which would be oonduoive to 
roof.layering of firedamp. Where (he air has a fairly IUgh velocity. it does 
to some extent sweep places just out of the general airflow and it  can be 
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directed with some force to such places as ripping edges. Many explosions 
in recent years have occurred in seams which are not very gassy and have 
been atLTibuted to the unexpected emission of firedamp. often in no great 
quantity and probably at a moderate rate. As the emission of firedamp 
can rarely be predicted accurately. the possibility. Or indeed probability. 
of ()(''C3sional abnormal emissions should be calered for by producing enough 
air to deal with such a situation. Had there been available on 0. 1 0  unit 
the quantity of air that there was on 0. 1 8  unit. and a means provided 
of deflecting a substantial .part of this air into the ripping. 1 do Jlot think 
that firedamp would have accumulated in quantity sufficient to have started 
a coa.! dust explosion. 
Air Ejectors 
102. These air-moving appliances are referred to in mining terminology 
as ,< VenLuris " .  It was suggested a t  lhe lnquiry that the two in 0.18 unit 
were objectionable. Neither contributed to the explosion but attention 
was, quite properly, drawn to the hazard inherent in inefficient earthing­
one of them was open Lo criticism in this respect-and the risk of recircula­
tion. 1t was pointed out that in some European countries there are require­
ments fixing minimum lengths of tubing to prevent recirculationl1:il, and 
i t  was suggested that in this country the use of any such device was, by 
virtue of the provisions of Section 58 (4) of the Mines and Quarries Act. 
1954. subject to the consent of an Inspector. In ventilation legislation, 
provisions governing earthing, siting and recirculation are laid down only 
in respect of a uxiliary fans. In view of receOl developments in the use of 
air ejectors the time has arrived whcn the safety aspects should be discussed 
by the Ministry of Power with other interested parties. 
Air Separation Doors 
103. The prolonged opening of any separation door may adversely affect 
face ventilation and I heard evidence which suggested that this had happened 
from time to time in W District Materials for 0. 1 0  unit had to pass through 
three sets of doors and be man-handled part of the way, a process not satis­
factory either from the aspect of ventilation or of transport. The wider 
adoption of long trunk conveyors in places where it is not possible to keep 
a separate track for matertials alongside the conveyor has added to the diffi­
culty of supplying material to faces and calls for careful consideration in 
planning the working of such a districL. 
AJuminium Allo)'s 
104. T had no difficulty in excluding as a possible source of ignition the 
aluminium alloy component of the stage loader motor situated some 30 yards 
from the face of 0.10 intake. It is well known, however, that incendive sparks 
can readily be produced by friction between aluminium alloy and rusty 
steel. Following the explosion at Glyncorrwg Colliery in 1954[H5J, restric­
tions on the use of equipment consisting partly or wholly of aluminium 
alloy were imposed upon managements by instructions from the Headquarters 
of the National Coal Board. after discussion with the Ministry of Power. but 
these restrictions applied only at the coal face. I think that the subject 
should now be re-examined with a view to extending the area of restriction 
to aU pans of a mine where firedamp may be a hazard. 
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Shotfuing Practice 
105. Some very conflicting evidence was given on shot firing practice. 
Many of the workmen witnesses said that they had never seen a break 
detector used ; witnesses who fired shots maintained that they had always 
used one. Only one was found after the explosion and there was no evidence 
to suggest the existence of any other i n  W District. The regulations require 
the owner of a mine to provide one break detector for each shotfirer on duty. 
It was contended by those concerned that one shotfirer normally fired all the 
shots on his sltift but that if. as happened occasionally. a deputy also fired 
shots. the shotfireT and the deputy arranged not to ,fire at the same time 
so that each could in turn have the use of the detector. This expedient could 
have been avoided by the proper provision of a detector for each shotfirer 
and for each deputy who fired shots. The break detector produced had 
clearly been very much used at some time. The point of the prong had 
become worn to such an extent that it did not satisfy the requirement of 
the official approval and, with the prong in thjs condition. a shotfirer could 
well fail to detect a completely longitudjnal break wide enough to be 
dangerous. 
106. Another serious irregularity alleged by many witnesses was that 
the specially provided stemming bags of fireproofed paper were sometimes 
partly. or even wholly, filled with fine coal instead of with suitable inert 
material. Twentv-two ba2S filled with fine 0031 were found on 0.10 unit 
after the explosion. It is possible that the Inquiry disclosed an isolated 
instance, but managements generally will be well advised forthwith to 
check the position at their collieries. The proper provision of suitable 
stemming material at any place where a shot is to be fired is a very important 
safety matter and it seems to me that from all points of view there must be 
a method better than one involving the use of paper bags, especially those 
intended to be filled by hand below ground. One way might be to prepare 
stemming material only on the surface and in a form readily recognisable 
by those who are to use it below ground. 
107. Tbe round of four shots i n  0.10 intake ripping on the night shilt 
before the explosion were fired when the only persons in tbe unit, other than 
the deputy. were the shotfirer and his assistant ; they did nOl advance the 
horsehead supports to the ground exposed by shotfiring. It was apparently 
not unusual to fire shots towards the end of one shift and leave the setting 
of support to the neWly-exposed ground for a (oLlowing shift. The practice 
of sholfiring at times when as few persons as possible are at risk is 
commendable, and there is much to support the view that sbotfiring should 
be carried out between slUfts. 1 1  is, however, essential that the operations 
associated with shotfiring-the preparatory setting of additional supports 
around the margins, the withdrawal of the supports from beneath the rooI 
to be brought down and tbe supporting of the newly exposed ground-should 
be carried out in sequence with the minimum of delay between stages after 
supports have been withdrawn. This is important in mines generaUy as a 
contribution to good roof conlrol and as a safeguard against accidents 
caused ,by falling stones. 
J08. There was no evidence at lhe Inquiry to support a suggestion made 
there that shots had been fired in the presence of firedamp. but A. Davies 
and L. R .  James both expressed the view that it is potentially dangerous 
24 
to fire a shot in a ripping where a hurdle sheet is in use to remove firedamp, 
and tbree published repons made by H.M. Inspectors about 30 years ago 
were referred to in support of this view. The matter is not relevant to this 
explosion if it  originated. as  I believe. in 0.10 intake road bead. but rbe 
question raised is one which merits further thought in the light of present­
day conditions and related considerations. Any step likely to militate 
against the use of hurdle sheets as precautionary measures might be a 
retrogression ;  many more might well be so used, preferably of a type 
such as was suggested in Safely Pamphlet No. 26[\7]. The shotfiring danger 
to be guarded against could perhaps be effectively lessened by an appro­
priate increase in the amount of general ventilation provided or the 
adoption of nredamp drainage, possibly localised, or both. 
109. My observations in  0. 1 8  return roadhead led me 10 think that 
shot holes were perhaps not being positioned as well as they might have 
been ; too many of them were bored at an inclination steeper than the 
strata and therefore were the more likely to intersect any bed separation 
breaks present. So rar as practicable. sbotboles sbould be drilled paralJel 
with the bedding planes. 
1 1 0. Every advantage should be taken of the new methods and materials 
that are continually becoming available (or use in shotfiring. A much safer 
explosive than the present ' equivalent sheathed ' has recently been 
developed. Under regulations soon 10 be made. approved types may be 
used, without exemption, to fire delay action rounds with approved 
detonators and exploders in any place where explosives may be used. This 
new explosive is certainly weaker than others now in use but the great 
advantages to be derived from short-delay blasting may well make it worth 
while to use heavier charges. or even to bore more holes. Mining engineers 
aided, I think, by more specialist advice should carefully examine the 
possibility of using this less incendive type more extensively. 
I l l .  Following a report by the National Coal Board's North Eastern 
Divisional Shotfiring Committee[l$), trials have been carried out on the 
injection of foam into ripping shot boles before blasting, as a means of 
reducing tbe risk of ignitions in breaks. H.M. Inspector [or tbe North 
Eastern Division described the progress of these trials in his report for 
1959[11.11. I understand that the trials are continuing satisfactorily and 
tbat similar trials. but on a smaller scale, are being carried out in South 
Wales. These trials should be encouraged because, in principle, the method 
provides a valuable safeguard against an ignition of firedamp by the 
potentially dangerous ripping shot. 
Coal Dust Dangers 
1 1 2. I have already recorded the results of the pre-explosion and post­
explosion roadway dust samples at Six Bells Colliery and pointed out that, 
although the pre-explosion samples were generally satisfactory, a wide­
spread explosion occurred. 
1 1 3. Many attempts have been made to correlate results of pre­
explosion and post-explosion dust samples and the position was well 
summarised by F. V. Tideswell in a Paper published in 1952[20). This 
paper cites examples which tend to show that in rope haulage roads and 
walking returns the results of post-explosion samples give a fair guide to 
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the compositIOn oC dust in those roads at the time of an explosion. in 
other roads, notably those where coal is carried by belt conveyor, wide 
differences may be expected ; beCore an explosion there may be imperfect 
mixing oC coal and stone dust. a situation particularly likely to arise on 
conveyor roads where rich deposits of coal dust can easily collect under 
the conveyors and on the conveyor structures. The deposits of coal dust 
under the conveyors are by no means easy to sample and this. together with 
dust from any coal being conveyed. may account Cor considerable 
discrepancies in the results oC samples collected before and after the explosion. 
1 14. There was evidence that tbe roadway conveyors were not kept 
clean : but cleaning and stone·dusling even to standards which would be 
regarded as very good practice are. unfortunately, not a complete safeguard 
against a coal dust explosion. 
1 1 5. Published work by Godbert, Bradshaw and Leach[·I) [.,) gave 
results of observations they made at  several collieries on t he rate of 
deposition oC coal dust on road ways inbye of loading or transCer points 
and in returns. They showed, among other findings. that during a coal 
filling shift tbe quantity oC dust in the coal actually on a conveyor may 
be. oC i·!self. quite sufficient to propagate a coal dust explosion. 
1 16. An ign.ition of firedamp alone in the relatively small quantity and 
in the conditions visualised \Ilear the face of 0.10 loading gate could 
conceivably have occurred without anybody knowing much about it. The 
propagation oC the explosion by coal dust again emphasises what I consider 
to be the biggest single problem of safety in modern coal mines-that of 
keeping in a safe condition those road ways in which coal is transported 
by conveyors. 
1 1 7. The limitations oC general stone·dusting on conveyor roads led 
some years ago to the conclusion that an additional safeguard was necessary 
and then to the suggestion that stone dust barriers should be used Cor this 
purpose. They cannot prevent an ignition oC coal dust but they can limit 
the extent of an explosion. Although for some years barriers had been 
used abroad, notably in Germany, it was not until 1952 that a decision 
was taken to use them in this country. It may well be that some mining 
engineers are still not convinced oC tbe vital need Cor barriers. Thjs may 
stem either from reluctance to accepl !.hat general stone·dusting cannot provide 
complete protection or Crom a fear that the very presence of barriers will 
lead to the neglect of general stone.dusting. I am convinced that stone 
dust barriers are necessary, but [ must emphasise [hat general stone-dusting 
is an equally essential part oC the protection ; the absence of general stone­
dusting could permit a coal dust explosion to develop a speed which barriers 
could not arrest. 
1 1 8. A National Coal Board's Production Department Instruction was 
issued on 1 st September, 1953, requiring managements to provide stone 
dust barriers on conveyor roads and setting out very clearly the reason 
for the provision. Regulations, which were not made earlier because it 
\l.as considered that insufficient was known on rhe subject, came into fo�ce 
on 1st October. 1960. These regulations require managers to prepare 
schemes specifying the position and type oC each barrier. and i t  is thus 
of the greatest importance that they should be convinced tbat the proper 
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provIsion of slone dust barriers is a vital requirement which. if neglected, 
might have disastrous consequences. 
1 1 9. The National Coal Board's Production Department Instruction in 
force a t  the time of the explosion at Six Bells Colliery may not have been 
altogether free from ambiguity but, on my reading, it  seems to have 
required ' primary ' barriers in the W District at the following places :-
( I )  0. 1 8  loader gate-not more than l OO yards inbye of the transfer 
point onto the conveyor in the main intake ; 
(2) 0.10 loader gate-not more than 1 00  yards inbye of the transfer point 
onto the conveyor in the main intake ; and possibly. 
(3) the main intake-at a point not more than 100 yards inbye or outbye 
of the Ira.nsfer point of 0.12 gate belt. 
The extent of the explosion might possibly have been much less had 
barriers been provided at these places. In the present stale of knowledge 
1 cannot dissent from the views expressed in evidence that barriers might 
have prevented the spread of the explosion from 0.10 unit 10 0. 1 8  unit. 
120. As a coal dusl explosion is. fortunately, a comparatively rare occur­
renre. the period of seven years since barriers were first introduced into this 
country has provided only three instances of their operation in practice. 
W. Brown, in his  special report on the explosion at Horden Colliery, Co. 
Durham. in 1953[23J referred to the destruction of a stone dust barrier in 
the following words : -
" Therefore. while it  is uncertain how far the explosion would have 
propagated had there been n o  stone dust barrier, it  is worthy of 
record that the explosion did. in fact, stop at. or very near the barrier 
and that despite the very mild e xplosion the barrier was satisfactorily 
destroyed and a substantial amount of its stone dust was dispersed." 
Two recent incidents seem to indicate satisfactory functioning of barriers. 
In the first, an ex,!])losion occurred during the re�opening of 13 mine which 
had been temporarily closed as a result of a fire ; investigation a�ter the 
explosion showed that it had been confined to the intake roadway leading 
to the affected face ; a stone dust barrier at the outbye end of this roadway 
had been discharged. but a second barrier in the main roadway oulbye 
had not been disturbed. The second relates to a district of a mine which 
was sealed-off to smother an underground fire ; when the district was 
re-opened some five months later. it was found that an explosion had 
occurred. but nhat it had been confined to a 300 yard length of roodW3y 
between the face and the site of a stone dust barrier. which had been 
discharged ; a detailed examination was not possible because the district 
had immediately to be re-sealed following a second explosion. 
1 2 1 .  The S.M.RE. who have been working on the problem of dust 
explosions for many years, are rto construct a large experimental gallery, 
which will be most valuable in the further research work quite clearly 
needed. 
122. The Safety and Health Committee of the Coal Industry National 
Consultative Council has devoted much lime and energy to the problems of 
coal dust explosion risks and continues to do so. A Sub-Commiuee of the 
Safety and Health Committee is considering the siting and construction of 
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stone dust barriers. The report of the Sub·Committee on Mining 
Explosionsrz�J referred briefly to the danger from wet coal dust. to which 
attention had been directed by the report on the explosion at Kames 
Colliery in I 957[2.'>J and recommended that a Working Party of experlS 
on coal dust explosions should be set up. This Working Party. having 
considered the results of experiments carried out by Dr. Cybulski in Poland 
and other evidence. has recently completed its report on wet coal dust and 
is to consider a review of the whole problem of coal dust explosions. which 
is now being prepared by the S.M.R.E. This consideration should include. 
as a matter of urgency. the adoption of precautionary measures in the zone 
of the greatest risk of firedamp ignition-that is within. say, 100 yards of 
the face. 
CONCLUSIONS 
123. In view of the scale and the exhaustive nature of the Inquiry. it was 
not surprising that some evidence dealt. quite properly. with alleged 
irregularities. I have referred to such of the matters raised as seemed to 
me to have sufficient bearing on the circumstances of the explosion to 
warranl inclusion in this report In commenting upon some facets of the 
evidence. l have considered it necessary to be critical. Despite this. 
I accept the opinion of L. R. lames in his most helpful evidence that the 
district was ' a good average district '. I t  is for this very reason that I find 
the circumstances of this disaster so disturbing. 
124. DUf\ing the earlier years of the century up to 1 927 w.hen nhe Marine 
Colliery explosion occurred, this part of the South Wales coalfield suffered 
an unfortunate series of disastrous explosions. Since then. until the 
explosion at Six Bells Colliery. there was relative immunity. During the 
same period. experience in the country as a whole was that the incidence 
and average severity of major explosions remained substantially unchanged. 
apart from a welcome reduction in exceptionally serious disasters following 
the introduction of general slone-dusting in 1921 {26J. New methods of 
work. in themselves advantageous from nearly all points of view. may 
increase the risk of firedamp ignition and it is necessary to ensure that 
the changes are matched by the adoption of appropriate precautionary 
measures against new or increased hazards. This explosion has empha· 
sised that the ignition of a comparatively small accumulation oC firedamp. 
such as is liable to occur in almost any seam. may i.n some circumstances 
cause a disastrous coal dust explosion. 
125. No one can say with certainty where or by what means the 
explosion at Six Bells Colliery started. But after careful consideration ] 
think that: 
( I )  The explosion started as an ignition of firedamp in the road head 
roof ,ul1ping of 0.10 in t.ke. 
(2) The accumulation of the firedamp might have been prevented had 
there been a hurdle sheet near the face ripping. 
(3) The cause of ignition was frictional heat produced by the impact 
of a piece of quartzitic rock faJling for a distance of about six feet. 
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from roof exposed by shotfiring. onto a steel girder forming part of 
a conveyor canopy. 
(4) The rall of this rock might have been prevented bad the roof 
between /the Jast-set steel arch and the new ripping face been 
supported immediately after the firing of a round of shots there 
about seven bours before. 
(5) An explosion of firedamp alone might not have caused any 
casualties as were was nobody in the vicinity at the time. 
(6) The explosion which spread throughout most of the district was 
one mainly of coal dust raised on the conveyor roads. 
(7) The ooaJ dust explosion might Ipossil!ly ,have been confined 10 0. 1 0  
unit had there been sufficient stone dust barriers suitably placed. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1 26. The possibilities 'that the explosion may not have originated in 
0.10 intake road head and may have been caused othefW'ise than by a fall 
of stone widen the field of recommendation of action designed to reduce 
the explosion risk. Implementation of some of these suggestions might 
well necessitate an increase in specialised staff. but I am convinced that in 
some fields much more specialised work should be done to help the manager 
in the discharge of his very onerous responsibiUty for safety. 
127. 1 recommend tbat : -
(I) The Working Party of the Sarety and Health Committee of the 
Coal Industry National Consultative Council which is to review 
the general problem of coal dust explosion hazards should consider. 
as a matter of urgency, what additional precautionary measures 
could be taken on lengths of conveyor roadways nearest the face 
and most likely to be affected by a firedamp explosion. 
(2) The potential danger of firedamp ignition associated with the fall 
of certain kinds of rock should be recognised by managements as 
an additional reason for perfecting measures designed to prevent 
falls at roadheads and for the maintenance at all times of effective 
ventilation of roof rippings. cavities and waste edges. 
(3) The ventilation engineering service of the National Coal Board 
should provide managers with the greatest possible specialist advice 
and assistance on firedamp drainage by boreholes and on all aspects 
of ventilation. 
(4) The National Coal Board's efforts designed to provide deputies 
with the best means of examining for firedamp in places out of 
easy reach should. if possible. be intensified. 
(5) All persons engaged in shotfiring should bear in mind that the safe 
performance of their duties demands meticulous care and manage· 
ments should lose no opportunity of satisfying themselves that it is 
being exercised. Ttbe nature and form of stemming mate11ial 
best suited to general use and least likely to lead to malpractice 
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should be investigated. Trials of (oam injection into ripping shot­
holes should be encouraged. A wider use of ex,plosives specialists 
couJd have many advantages. 
(6) Mining engineers of the National Coal Board and other interested 
parties in South Wales should give fresh consideration to ways and 
means of reducing lhe incidence of large cavities on road heads 
and of dealing safely with any which occur. 
(7) The Ministry of Power should review with interested parties the 
use below ground of air ejectors. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Names of Men Killed 
Reference 
Name Age Occupation No. on 
Plan No. 2 
lvor James Balton 48 Cutterman 45 
Daniel James Bancroft 46 CoUier on Panzer . . .  36 
Robert Charles Brown 35 Roof Comrol Officer 20 
Frank Cooper · . .  · . .  44 Supplies Man 29 
Joseph Corbett . . .  · . . 50 Haulier 43 
Thomas George Crandon 46 Repairer 33 
Waiter Thomas Davies 34 Borer 28 
Royden James Edwards · . . 27 Repairer 8 
Pefey Gardon Elsey · . .  52 Repairer · . .  · . .  30 
Albert John Evans 34 Packer 23 
Leonard Keilh Frampton 29 CoUier 1 7  
A1bef! Gardner . . .  · . . · . . 59 Assistant Cutterman 44 
George GoJdspink 37 Repairer · . .  1 4  
CLive Alan Griffiths 1 8  Prop Checker · . .  • • •  1 3  
Yernon Alexander Griffiths 33 Deputy Grade I 1 1  
Ernest Victor Harding . . .  · . .  5 1  Deputy Grade I 41 
Idris Jones 57 Packer 1 5  
John Peceival Jones · . .  56 Repairer · . . · . .  · . .  38 
Joseph John King · . .  · . .  56 Packer 37 
Dennis Edmund Lane . . .  · . . 19 Wireman .. .  I 
Georgc Henry Luffman · . .  55 General Worker . . . 7 
Telford Cecil Mapp 42 General Worker . . .  l2 
Herbert Amos Mayberry 55 Dumper . . .  5 
William John Mordcn . . .  52 Engine Ori, er 4 
Sidney Moore · . .  · . .  54 Repairer · . .  3 
Colin Malcolm Oonald Morgan 26 Repairer · . .  16 
Colin Reginald Morgan 22 Assistant Repai.rer 26 
Ray Martin Morgan · . . 44 Repairer · . . 27 
Islwyn Morris · . .  44 Deputy Grade I t . . .  3 1  
Anlhony Verdun Partridge · . .  20 Assistant Borer · . .  1 2  
WiUiam Henry Partridge 45 Borer · . .  1 9  
Trevor Paul · . . 25 Assistant Repairer 1 0  
Wilfred Alfred Charles Phipps 60 Cuttennan · . . · . .  6 
Albert George Pinkett . . .  45 Collier 1 8  
Frederick Rees . . .  · . .  37 Fitter Grade U 25 
Mansel Reynolds · . .  · . . 21 Measurer . . .  21 
William Glyn Reynolds 21 Assistant Repairer 24 
Wilfred Hughes Thomas 57 Repairer · . . 40 
Arthur Waters . . .  · . . · . .  37 General Worker . . .  34 
Phillip John Walkins · . .  53 Engine Driver 2 
Wilfred Weston · . .  47 Waler Infuser on Panzer . . .  42 
Frederick White · . . 58 Undcr.manager · . .  · . .  35 
William Burdon Whittingham 55 Assistant Repairer 39 
Richard John WiUiams 51 General Worker . . .  9 
John Woosnam . . .  24 Fitter Grade I · . .  22 
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Name of Witness 
Alien, A. J. 
Alexander. A. L. . . .  
Assirati. C. . . .  
Aylesbury, A. T. G. 
Baker, K . . . .  
Beech, E. J.  
Bilton, C. A. 
Boots, E. D. 
Coleman, W. 
Cook, R. S. 
Davies, A. 
Davies, W. H. 
Doel, W . . . .  
Do\\-dcn, W. H. 
. . . 
. .  . 
. .  . 
Edwards, D. E. " .  
Evans, J. 1-1. 
Fear, L. G. 
Grindle, J. 
Gwilliam, S. 
Hall, R. J. G. 
Harh .. ell. F. J. 
Hewitt, S. J. 
HiJlman, H. 1. 
HiLlman, G. E. 
HoUand, S. 
Halt, A. H. 
Halt, T. J.  
Hooking, J.  H.  
. . . 
. . . 
lames, L. R. 
Jenkins. W. 
Jenkms, W. V. 
lohnston, H. L. S. 
Jones, A. S. 
Law, R. H. 
Legge, H. J. 
Lewis, C. J. 
Lewis. T. J. 
Luther, V. 




Morgan, T. G. 
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. . .  
. . . 
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. .  . 
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. . .  
. . .  
· . .  
. .  . 
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. .  . 
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. . . 
. . . 
..  . 
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APPENDIX [I 
Names of Witnesses 
Occupation 
Timberman's Assistant 
H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines and Quarries 









Rescue Brigade Man 
O\lerman 
Assistant Repairer 
Superintendent, Crumlin Rescue Station 
Labourer 





Senior PrinCipal Scientific Officer, S.M.R.E. 























Name of Witness 
Nash, W. C. 
Owen, I .  
Parsons. J. S. 
Poy.ell. W. B. 
Price, D. E. 
Pumen. D. 
Pumell, 1"1. 
Rees, B. . 
Rees, L. . . .  
Richards, E. H.  
Richings, R. W. 
Rideout, C. F. 
Shore, J. . . 
Simpson, R. W. 
Small, J. . . .  
Smith, Albert 
Smith, Alexander 
Stokes. J. C. 
Sutton. J. E. M. 
Thirlaway, J. T. 
Thomas. E. V. 
Thomas. W. E. ..  
Trig:er. K . . . .  
Vagg. S. I.  
Waiters, E. 
Williams. C. H. 
Williams, R. 
Winters. J. 
WorthinglOn, K. S. 


































H.M. Inspector of Mechanical Engineering 
Assistant Timberman 
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APPENDIX III  
Ignitions by Impacts bct�ccn Rocks and bch\een Rock and Steel 
l\Iaindy CoUier�', 1896: Ln the clearing of a fall, a cavity 1 8  fect hIgh was created ; 
a fall  In the cavity is bche\-cd IQ ha\c been responsIble for an explosion occuTrlng 
whilst no onc was In the mine. (Explosion at Marine Colliery, Monmouthsrure: 
Report by S,r Henry Walker, CRE.: Cmd. 3048,) 
Ferndale Colliery, 1907: A small quantity ar gas was bellc\ed to have been Ignited 
by a fall of strong siliceous rock from a place about 1 2  fect above floor level durmg 
the clearing of debris brought down in repair \\ork. (Report on Marine Colliery 
explosion.) 
Belle Vue Colliery. Alberta, Canada, 1910--191 I :  Three separate e.xplosions 
occurred durmg the extraction of pillars in a 1 3  feet thick seam inchned at an angle 
of 45 degrees; It IS behe\ed that the ignitions v.ere due to collisions between pieces 
of bituminOUs sandstone as Ihey fell down the steeply inclined roads. (Stlrilng and 
Cadman, Transactions of the Inslltution of Mining Enginecrs, Volume XLIV, page 
740.) 
L1ettl' Shenkin Colliery, C\\mbach, 1913: Repairers \\ere "orklng at a fall when 
another large fall  of stone occurred: they sa" flame rising \\hen the stone fell on 
some iron bars. (Report on Manne Colliery explosion.) 
Minnie Pit, 1918:  The fall of a siliceous Slone from a place about 12 feet abme 
the floor of a Ihick coal seam worked by pillar and Slall was gl\en as a possible cause 
of the explosion. (Explosion at M innie Pit of the Podmore Hall CoUiery, North 
Staffordshire: Report by W. Walker. CB.E. : Cmd. 810.) 
Mine in Germany, 1922: An explosion was produced by the Impact of a large 
piece of sandstone on a steel roof support arch. (U.S. Bureau of Mines Information 
Circular 7727 ( Hartmann).) 
HHlcrcst Mine, Alberta, Canada, 1926: Mr. G. S. Rice, Chief Mining Engineer 
of the U.S. Bureau of Mines. camc to the conclusion that fncllonal sparks or healing 
due to falling and sliding rock \\ere possible causes of the ignition of firedamp. 
(Safety in Mines Research Board Paper No. 46. 1928.) 
larinc Colliery. J\tonmoulhshjre, 1927: Sir Henry WaU,er considered that the 
explosion m.1y ha\e been due to stone falling on other stone \\·hich had already fallen. 
The probable place of ignition was on a working face. where a fall involving a bed of 
siljceous sandstone. was being cleared. ( Report on Marine Colllcry explosion.) 
C\\m Colliery, 1949: A fnll occurred in a cavity at a roadhcad; stone collapscd 
about eight feet on to an arch girder and produced an ignition. ( Reports of H.M. 
Inspectors of Mines for 1949: Soulh Western DIVision : Report by T. A. Rogers.) 
Le\\is l\lerthyr Collie..-),. 1957: Hard ' dirt · fell from a roadhead caVlly for a 
distance of 20 feet on to arch girders and produccd an ignition. (Explosion at Lewis 
Merlhyr Colliery, Glamorganshire: Reporl by T. A. Jones, O.D.E .. Cmnd. 3 1 6.)  
Mine in Virginia, 195ft: SUPPOrlS had been \\ Ithdrawn from a section: an explosion 
associated with a fall occurred. Miners 50 to 75 feet from the fal l  saw sparks and a 
flash of fire Just before the explosion. (U.S. Bureau of M ines Rcporl of lnvestigations 




I .  Explosion at North Gawber (Lidgett) Colliery. Yorkshire: Report by Sir 
Henry Walker, CRE., LL.D.:  COld. 5214. 
2. The Ignition of Firedamp by the Heat of Impact of Hand Picks against Rocks: 
Safety in Mines Research Board Paper No. 62: M .  J. Burgess and R. V. Wheeler. 
3. The Ignition of Firedamp by the Heat of Impact of Rocks: Safety in Mines 
Research Board Paper No. 46: M .  J. Burgess and R. V .  Wheeler. 
4. Safety in Mines Research. 1959: Thirty·eighth Annual Report : Page 20. 
5. Explosion at Marine Colliery, Monmouthshire : Report by Sir Henry Walker. 
C.B.E.: Cmd. 3048. 
6. Reports of H.M. Inspectors of Mines for 1949; South Western Division : 
Report by T. A. Rogers. 
7. Explosion at Lewis Merthyr Colliery. Glamorganshire: Report by T. A. Jones. 
O.B.E.: Cmnd. 3 1 6. 
8. Explosion at Sulton Colliery, Noltinghamshire: Report by A. Winslanley. 
C.B.E., D.Se. : Cmnd. 327. 
9. Roadway Control by Plann.ing and Layout :  National Coal Board South 
Western Division : Divisional Committee on Strata Control : Fourth Report September. 
1952. 
10. Reports or H.M. Inspectors of Mines and Quarries ror 1958: South Western 
Division : Report by T. A. Jones, O.B.E. 
1 1 .  Vermiculite in Coal Mines: New Method or FiHing Large Roor Cavities : 
H. Wright: Iron and Coal Trades Review, Vol. 1 8 1 ,  No. 4802, Pages 231-24 l .  
12. Atmospheric Conditions in Mines: a study of the Physical Condition or Mine 
Air :  Third Report or the General Research Committee of the Monmouthshire and 
South Wales Coal O\\ ners' Association. 
1 3 .  A Study of the Movement or Methane/Air Mixtures in the Wastes or LongwaIl 
Workings: R. H. Clough. O.B.E. and J. Carver: Transactions or the Institution or 
Mining Engineers. Vol. 1 1 6, Part 2, Page 1 3 1 .  
14. The Development and Application or Methane Drainage in the North Stafford· 
shire Coalfield: E. Steele, M . I . Min.E. and D. C. Vales, Assoc.l.Min.E.:  Transactions 
or the Institution or Mining Engineers, Vol. 1 1 9, Part 4, Page 2 1 3. 
1 5 .  Report on the Conrerence on Sarety in Coal Mines: European Coal and Steel 
Community: March, 1957, Page 3 1 .  
16. Explosion at Glyncorrwg Colliery, Glamorganshire: Report by T. A. Jones, 
O.B.E.: Cmd. 9553. 
1 7. The Ventilation of Rippings: Ministry or Fuel and Power Sarety Pamphlet 
No. 26: 1957. 
18.  Ignition Hazard due to Shot firing: Third Report or the National Coal Board 
North Eastern Division Shot firing Committee: Transactions of the lnstitution of 
Mining Engineers, Vol. 1 1 5. Part 1 2, page 894. 
19.  Reports or H.M. Inspectors or Mines and Quarries ror 1959: North Eastern 
Division: Report by H. J. Perrins. O.RE. 
20. Methods of Examination Following a Colliery Explosion: F. V. Tideswell. 
O.B.E., Ph.D., F.R.I.e.: Transactions or the Institution of M ining Engineers, Vol. 1 12. 
Part 3, Page 1 57.  
2 1 .  The Deposition or Dust on Conveyor Roads: Safety in Mines Research 
Establishment, Research Report No. 106: F. Bradshaw, A.  L. Godbert. Ph.D. and 
E. Leach: October, 1 954. 
22. The Deposition or Dust in Colliery Workings: F.  Bradshaw and A. L. 
Godbert, M .Se., Ph. D . :  Transactions of the lnstitution or Mining Engineers, Vol. l i S. 
Part 9, Page 677. 
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23. Explosion at Horden Colliery, Co. Durham: Report by W. Bro""'n : Cmd. 
9399. 
24. Coal Industry National Consultative Council :  Safety and Health Conmuttee: 
Report of the Sub-Commitlee on Mining Explosions. February. 1959 r" The Br)an 
Report " ). 
25. Explosion �I Kames Colliery, Ayrshire: Report by Sir Harold Robert�, 
C.B.E., M.C., B.Se. : Cmnd. 467. 
26. Mine Explosions: The Current Hazard: F. V. Tides�ell, O.B.E., Ph.D . •  
F.R.I .e.:  Transactions of the Institution of Mining Engineers. Vol. 1 14. Part 10. 
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